The Constitution and the One-Sex College by Moody, Lizabeth A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1971
The Constitution and the One-Sex College
Lizabeth A. Moody
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Law
and Gender Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lizabeth A. Moody, The Constitution and the One-Sex College, 20 Clev. St. L. Rev. 465 (1971)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/6
The Constitution and the One-Sex College
Lizabeth A. Moody*
N BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION,
1 the Supreme Court said, "Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." Despite this, the lower
federal courts are continuing, in the sex area, to deal in terms of "sep-
arate but equal." The Supreme Court acquiesces silently, 2 while rulings
upholding colleges and universities in limiting admissions to one sex
challenge the Brown rationale.
In Williams v. McNair,3 plaintiffs, all males, sued to enjoin the en-
forcement of a South Carolina statute limiting to women admissions
at Winthrop College, a state college located at Rock Hill, South Caro-
lina. The three-judge district court, upholding the statute's validity,
concluded that discrimination in the admission of students based on
sex was rationally justified on the basis of history, tradition and com-
mon practice. The court further stated that, even if such justification
could be discounted, there could be no denial of equal protection where
the sex-segregated school was only a constituent part of a state-wide
system of higher education which made available to students the choice
of co-education, all-male and all-female institutions, especially where
no school was distinguished by a particular course of instruction or
prestige factor not available elsewhere in the system.
The court relied on three previous cases which had applied the same
reasoning. Alired v. Heaton4 and Heaton v. Bristol5 involved efforts by
females to gain admission to all-male Texas Agricultural and Mechanical
College. In both cases, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the state's exclusion of females violated the fourteenth amendment of
the U. S. Constitution. The Texas courts refused to view Texas A. & M.
as a single institution apart from the state's entire system of higher edu-
cation. In Heaton v. Bristol, the court said:
...the controlling question with reference to the above matter is
whether the State, as a matter of public policy, may as a part of
its total system of higher education maintain, for the choice and
service of its citizens, one all-male and one all-female institution,
along with sixteen institutions which are co-educational. We think
undoubtedly the answer is Yes. Such a plan exalts neither sex at
the expense of the other, but to the contrary recognizes the equal
rights of both sexes to the benefits of the best, most varied system of
higher education that the State can supply.6
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law; National
President of the Women's Equity Action League; etc.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 In each of the cases involving this issue which has reached the Supreme Court, it
has either affirmed without opinion, Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971) or de-
nied certiorari, Heaton v. Bristol, 359 U.S. 230 (1959) and Allred v. Heaton, 364 U.S.
517 (1960).
3 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970, aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
4 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960).
- 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
6 Id. at 100.
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In Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,7 the court
held that the state had violated the equal protection provisions of the
United States Constitution by maintaining a one-sex institution. In so
holding, however, the court embraced the "separate but equal" rationale
of the earlier Texas cases, which was to be later followed in Williams v.
McNair.s It found that no institution in the Virginia system of colleges
and universities offered to females the same facilities and prestige that
the University of Virginia at Charlottesville offered to male students.
It limited the constitutional violation to a situation where the state did
not provide to women an education equal to that offered to men. The
court said:
We hold, and this is all we hold, that on the facts of this case, these
particular plaintiffs have been, until the entry of the order of the
district judge, denied their constitutional right to an education equal
with that offered men at Charlottesville and that such discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.9
These cases bring into sharp focus the question whether the Consti-
tution permits government-sponsored institutions of higher learning on
the basis of sex. Such institutions have a lengthy history in this country
and, during the early years of the Republic, were the rule rather than
the exception. Tradition, however, is not the test of constitutional per-
missibility.
The obvious analogy is that of institutions segregated by race. In
Brown v. Board of Education,10 the Supreme Court sweepingly con-
demned segregation of students in public schools solely on the basis of
race, on the ground that such segregation deprived black students of
equal educational opportunities. The Supreme Court has yet to defin-
itively hold that segregation on a sexual basis is likewise condemned."1
Current concern over the lack of opportunities 12 for women in our so-
ciety has caused many to look to the equal protection guarantees of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments for the same relief from sex discrimi-
nation that has been afforded in the case of racial discrimination.
To constitute a denial of equal protection, the statute or govern-
ment action complained of must involve both state action and a dis-
crimination which has no reasonable basis."3
7 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
8 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
9 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Alired v. Heaton, 364 U.S. 517 (1960);
Heaton v. Bristol, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
12 See TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION, REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION (Advance Draft, 1971)
at 63 if. Comparisons of the participation and attainments of men and women in
higher education reveal a clearly unequal pattern. . . . We believe that it is not
the case that opportunities exist for women which they simply decline to exercise.
Rather we find that there are specific barriers which block their progress and which
will not disappear without conscious effort. See also REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN'S RiGHrs AND REsPoNSIBnrtIEs, A Matter of Simple Justice (1971).
13 Sex Discrimination in College Admissions: The Quest for Equal Educational Op-
portunities, 56 IOWA L. Rv. 209, 211 (1970).
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State Action
Each of the cases which has been brought to date has involved a
state institution. The question of state action, therefore, did not arise.
Of the three hundred forty-seven one-sex schools in the country, only
sixteen are "public" in the sense of state instrumentalities. 14 The re-
mainder are "private," at least in the generally accepted sense of the
word. A definitive constitutional interpretation will inevitably have a
wider effect on the so-called private institutions than on the clearly
public ones. Traditionally, a private school has been allowed to dis-
criminate by sex, age, race, or in any other way it might determine. 15
The question is whether this is legal. The easy answer is to divide the
institutions between public (where such discrimination shall be for-
bidden) and private (where it is to be allowed). Unfortunately, the
concept of state action is not so mechanical.
A definitive analysis of the relationship of the private university
to the public sector appears in "Private Universities and Public Law." 16
As Professor O'Neill concludes in that article, most private universities
are "public" to some degree; but, as he further emphasizes, some are
much more governmentally involved and affected than others. Consti-
tutional questions concerning private educational institutions cannot, on
a practical level, be resolved on the existence or non-existence of "state
action," or any similar black letter catchword. As Professor O'Neill con-
tends, constitutional questions involving such institutions must be re-
solved on the interaction of two elements-the nature of the institution
and the relief sought.17 He would require little in the way of public
involvement to hold that a school may not constitutionally refuse to ad-
mit a student solely because of race, while urging that private institu-
tions should be allowed to develop experimental programs which would
be clearly denied to a public institution. The problem with the one-sex
school is: Into which of these categories does it fall? The problem is not
easy to solve if the rationale of the cases to date is to be followed.
If the analogy of sexual discrimination to racial discrimination is re-
garded as perfect, clearly neither the public nor the private institution
may opt out of equal protection requirements by a claimed lack of in-
volvement in state action. If, on the other hand, a useful purpose can
be found for sex-segregated programs in higher education, then more
latitude may be allowed. In short, "state action" may or may not be
found sufficient to force sexual integration of a private school if such
classification is determined to constitute an unreasonable classification
for constitutional purposes.
14 Statistics furnished by the Women's Action Program of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (based on information supplied it by the U. S. Office of Edu-
cation). Three percent (3%) of the students enrolled in higher education attend one-
sex schools. The numbers of such institutions in the United States are: Public-
11 male, 5 female. Private-143 male, 188 female.
15 See Sex Discrimination in College Admissions: The Quest for Equal Educational
Opportunities, 56 IOWA L. R. 209, 218, n. 53 (1970).
16 O'Neill, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155 (1970).
17 Id.
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Reasonable Classification
The second part of the equal protection requirement is that of
reasonable classification. Any classification of an individual must be for
a legitimate purpose, and must have a fair and substantial relation to
that purpose.1 8 In the cases involving racial discrimination which fol-
lowed Brown v. Board of Education,1" the court adopted a position
which very nearly accorded to racial discrimination the presumption
that it was per se unreasonable. Sex discrimination has fared better in
the courts.
Kanowitz20 has divided sex discrimination cases into pre-1963 cases
and post-1963 cases. 21 The earlier cases, beginning with Bradwell v.
State22 and reaching a high point in Mueller v. Oregon23 accept the
principle that sex is a valid basis of classification. No further inquiry
is made into either the legitimacy of purpose or the reasonableness of
the relationship between such purpose and the required classification.
Sex, according to such cases, is per se a reasonable classification.
Since 1963, women have, with accelerating persistence, sought a
re-evaluation of this theory. Though the Supreme Court has not as
yet found a violation of equal protection in any sex case, the lower
federal courts are beginning to reflect a sensitivity in the area.24 It has
been said that the constitutional sex classification may be disappearing. 25
The pendulum appears to be swinging, if not to the point where a
classification based on sex is discriminatory per se, at least to the point
where any classification based solely on sex is "suspect." Suspect classi-
fications require "rigid scrutiny" by the courts and must be supported by
a broader justification than a "merely rational connection with a legiti-
mate public purpose." 26
Given this assumption-that sex is a suspect classification-is there
any theory upon which a one-sex institution can be sustained?
Is See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1067 (1969).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-based Discrimination in American Law,
48 NEB. L. REV. 131 (1968).
21 1963 is the date of the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CovMIssIoN ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN. The findings of that Commission started a new evaluation of the place and
problems of women in our society.
22 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). There the court held that a woman could constitu-
tionally be denied a license to practice law.
23 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
24 Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)
(a licensed bar's refusal to serve women is a denial of equal protection); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (where a statute provided that women,
not men, could be committed to a state farm for indefinite terms); White v. Crook,
251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (holding that exclusion of women from jury duty
is unconstitutional); Karczewki v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill.
1967) (invalidating Indiana's practice of denying women the right to sue for loss
of consortium); Mollere v. S. E. La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) (hold-
ing that women students cannot be required to live in dormitories if men are not so
compelled); and Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748
(N.D. Miss. 1969) (providing that unwed mothers cannot be excluded from being
students solely because they were unwed mothers).
25 See The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 296, 314 (1970).
26 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAiv. L. REV. 1065, 1087 ff.
(1969).
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All cases to date support the theory that the state need give only
equal educational opportunity to men and women, and that such op-
portunity can be given in a sex-segregated institution. (A close read-
ing of the cases, with the exception of Kerstein,27 suggests that in the
case of a state institution, there may be a further requirement that edu-
cational opportunity be afforded in a statewide educational program of-
fering co-education as well.) This is in obvious contrast to the race dis-
crimination cases.
At the outset, the situation with respect to the one-sex institution
must be differentiated from sexual discrimination in admission to a co-
educational institution, where there is no rationale for discrimination;
i.e., we are not here discussing quotas or differing standards for women
(or men) at institutions ostensibly non-sexually oriented.28 Our ques-
tion is purely the constitutionality of a one-sex (male or female) educa-
tional institution.
It is unlikely, since the Brown case, that the doctrine of "separate
but equal" would be invoked by any court to sustain a judgment, at
least if the phrase is squarely used. Nonetheless, the cases on one-sex
institutions to date are plainly based on this theory, no matter how care-
fully the courts avoid the language. A variation of the doctrine, how-
ever, may be legitimate in the area of sex discrimination in higher edu-
cation, even though it would not be acceptable in the area of race dis-
crimination at the present time.29 That is, the state may provide a
choice to students of a variety of environments in which he or she
chooses to study. So long as the choice is a genuine one, it will not and
should not be constitutionally prohibited. The range of choices to be
provided then becomes a matter for the legislature, and will reflect
current public thinking and such other factors as availability of funds
and facilities. The offering of such choices will only come into conflict
with the constitution at a point where the choices are determined to ac-
complish an impermissible purpose.
This theory, admittedly, has been rejected in the area of race dis-
crimination. In Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville,30 the court
disapproved a state statute which allowed local school boards to provide
separate schools for black and white children as well as integrated
27 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). In this case the court appears to be saying that
equality is all that is required.
28 See Sex Discrimination in College Admissions: The Quest for Equal Educational
Opportunities, 56 IowA L. REv. 209, 212 (1970) where a number of arguments are
offered and rejected to support classifications based on sex in educational institutions
generally, i.e. the expense of altering facilities to provide for female housing, dining
and comfort; the prestige of certain all-male institutions, that would be sacrificed
by female admissions; the state's interest in providing a sound academic environment
free from the daily diversions present at a coeducational school; the popularity of
men's schools that keeps attendance figures high; the relative ease of administering
a unisexual school as compared with its coeducational counterpart, and a state's
interest in ensuring the fiscal solidarity of future family providers by adequately
educating its male populace.
29 See, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37
U. CHI. L. REv. 296, 311 (1970) in which the author disagrees with this analysis and
suggests that sex separation is as illegitimate as racial separation.
30 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959).
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schools. The court held that the maintenance of separate segregated
schools was antagonistic to the principles of the fourteenth amendment.
The court, in part, based its reasoning on the theory that to exclude
children of one race from any school bred a feeling of inferiority in the
children of the minority race.
Applied across the board, the theory of the Kelley case requires a
monolithic public educational system. At least two very reasonable argu-
ments can be made to support the theory that there is no such constitu-
tional requirement in every area of possible discrimination. One is that
rulings such as Kelley are based on the pragmatic fact that in the case
of public schools in southern states, a real choice cannot be made avail-
able. If all-white schools were provided, no white would attend the
non-segregated school. Thus any choice offered to black students
would be wholly illusory. Really this is not a constitutional but a factual
argument. If, as seems evident, where co-education is made available
as an alternative, it will not fail for lack of either males or females,
there is no practical and, it is submitted, no constitutional reason for
denying a choice to those who prefer one-sex schools. In "Jane Crow
and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII," 31 Murray and East-
wood support such a proposition by suggesting that, in the area of sex dis-
crimination, only classifications which treat men and women differently
are invalid and that those which treat them separately are not. In their
discussion of the effect of an abandonment of the classification by sex
doctrine (that is, the doctrine that classification on the basis of sex is
permissible per se), they say:
A second category of law or official practice that would not be-
come invalid if the "classification by sex" doctrine were discarded
are those that do not treat men and women differently, but only
separately: for example, separate dormitory facilities for men and
women in a state university or separate toilet facilities in public
buildings. Unlike separation of the races in our culture separation
of the sexes in these situations carries no implication of inferiority
for either sex. 2
In other words, the conclusion that racially segregated schools are
inimical to the well-being of one class of citizens is not a constitutional
conclusion but a factual one. And there is no evidence to support a
similar factual conclusion in the case of sexually segregated schools,
particularly when co-educational institutions are available.3 3
At present, the greatest concern in this area is that of providing
women with equal educational opportunities.3 4 As a policy matter, as-
31 Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. Rsv. 232, 240
(1965).
32 Id. at 240.
33 There is little in the way of conclusive research in the area of coeducational as
opposed to segregated education. Although the trend is toward coeducation as wit-
nessed by its adoption by such schools as Yale and Princeton, the motivation seems
to be toward attracting better students and on the basis student preference. See
PATTERSON Commirmz REaRT RE PRINCETON (Fall, 1968). One study of high school
students indicates that there is a value in sex segregated schools. KOLESNIK, CO-
EDUCATION: SEx DFEMNCES AND THE SCHOOL (1969).
34 See supra note 12.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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suming women are disadvantaged, the question is: what is the appropri-
ate educational system to provide such opportunities? In the early years
after Brown v. Board of Education, a color blind theory of education
was generally accepted.35 Must a sexually neuter theory of education
be also accepted? In the lag to catch up with racial discrimination, sex
discrimination has skipped a generation of educational thinking. The
Brown theory is now being challenged, at least in respect to discrimi-
nation which may be in favor of a minority group. Demands for ethnic
studies programs and separate living facilities are becoming the rule, not
the exception. White students have been excluded from an all-black
studies program at Antioch College, and Northwestern University has
an all-black dormitory.36 Afirmative action programs and quotas fav-
orable to minorities are given wide consideration. It has been said:
It can safely be predicted that this is only the beginning of the
coming struggle over ethnic studies programs and whom they are
to include and exclude. The ethnic studies problem may require
some modification of the Brown doctrine and its immediate pred-
ecessor cases dealing with higher education as the Supreme Court
may find that the law of the 1950's does not fit the demands made
by minority groups of the 1970's. Several law professors have al-
ready suggested that Brown v. Board of Education may be lapsing
into "irrelevance." 37
There may be a legitimate and constitutional function for one-sex
schools, especially those for women, so long as societal assumptions and
attitudes deny the equality of women both as to their talents and as to
their aspirations. If the "black studies" development is a criterion, the
elimination of women's colleges may well be only the prologue to a de-
mand that they be immediately reinstated.
The debate here is not whether the overly simplistic view, ex-
pressed in Brown, has or has not contributed to the educational stand-
ards of the country as a whole. (In fact it clearly has done so.) The
point is that, assuming the validity of the standards set forth in Brown
by the Supreme Court, there is no need, either legal or factual, to apply
those standards to sex separation in education.38 The plain fact is that
"separate educational facilities" are not "inherently unequal" as applied
to sexually segregated institutions. If the choice of sexually segregated
or non-sexually segregated education is, as a factual matter, available
to all, and all other circumstances are equal, it is apparent that the United
States Constitution does not inhibit the offering of that choice.
35 See supra note 18, at 1089.
83 Avins, Black Studies, White Separation and Reflected Light on College Segrega-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment From Early Land Grant College Policies, 10
WASHBURN L. J. 181, 182 (1971).
87 Id. at 183.
38 In higher education legislation introduced in Congress this session, two measures
which would otherwise ban discrimination on the basis of sex assume the constitu-
tionality of certain sexual discriminations. H. R. 5191 would except situations where
valid reasons for discrimination exist and H. R. 7248 would exempt all schools
which are presently one sex.
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